Excerpts from McKay’s Notes on The Case of Raoul Wallenberg.

C.G.McKay

1 © C.G.McKay, January 2011. The present version of October 2011 contains a number of corrections and revisions to the original manuscript which was presented at a UD Seminar on Wallenberg at the beginning of 2011. It is released on the internet as a contribution to public knowledge of the case of Raoul Wallenberg. While people are encouraged to make use of its findings, the author expects in return that they will follow accepted scholarly practice and acknowledge this work as a source by citing the title and authorship of this article and its Web URL in the usual manner.
BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION

My work on Raoul Wallenberg has concentrated on his mission to Budapest rather than on his subsequent fate in Russia. I have chosen to examine various assertions, claims and plain simple innuendo to the effect that this mission may have involved other than purely humanitarian goals. In particular, I have looked both at possible connections with various secret services – not simply the OSS- and at possible hidden economic motives. As a result, I have investigated in some detail a string of peripheral figures, many of whom are hardly mentioned in more orthodox presentations of Raoul’s mission. Although I have found nothing to suggest that he acted as an important secret agent with a task radically different from his explicit humanitarian mission to aid the Jews in Hungary, I have unearthed substantial archival evidence showing that he did have interesting contacts with several people who were working for the secret services- Cheshire in Stockholm and Lolle Smit in Budapest – are two fascinating examples. But is this really surprising? As I have had occasion to remark on numerous occasions, it would have been impossible for any neutral businessmen to travel about wartime Europe without contacts with at least one secret service and more probably with several. Moreover Raoul’s purely humanitarian but dangerous task in Budapest necessarily involved clandestine

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2 This work began officially with a small grant from UD in support of independent research on Wallenberg at the end of 2004 although I had earlier become interested in the case of Raoul Wallenberg through discussions with my old friend, Sven Wäsström, an expert on Swedish intelligence and its history. Part of my initial task was to go through the so-called “C-papper”- Swedish intercepts of wartime German teleprinter traffic- in search of telegrams dealing with Wallenberg. This arduous task yielded very little apart from a few telegrams relating to Wallenberg’s applications for a German visa for his travels in wartime Europe.

3 “Peripheral” in the sense that their connection to Wallenberg was peripheral. In terms of what they did, they may have been far from peripheral. I would argue that this was so in the case of Lolle Smit, for example.
methods - from secret contacts to bribery if it was to be carried out effectively. That Raoul Wallenberg and Lauer may from time to time have performed certain favours on behalf of their secret service friends is for me entirely plausible. Look on it as a quid pro quo pro. The crucial point is surely to retain some balance in judging this sort of thing and to abstain from seeing everything in terms of the Angel-Spy dichotomy: there is nothing hitherto which has come to light to suggest that Wallenberg’s role in relation to the Secret Services was other than minor and more or less what one would expect in the circumstances.

Perhaps the real lesson to be learned from my studies is to see how very dangerous Raoul’s mission was - not simply because of the obvious perils involved on the ground in Budapest but because of the great web of diplomatic and intelligence-related activities going on simultaneously. Essentially Wallenberg was entering an area where certain powerful fields of force operated, forces which were not immediately detectable. And if this were not enough, there was a still greater force, Suspicion, which fed on all of these. Indeed it is Suspicion in its many forms which lies at the core of my own investigations. Irrespective of whether they are justified or unjustified, suspicions are important constituents of human behaviour and can even be the dominant force in policies and actions. Did one fully realise the full range of dangers involved in Wallenberg’s mission in Stockholm, 1944? Should- could-additional diplomatic steps - confidence-building measures - have been taken to put the Russians more fully in the picture? And if not, was this because Wallenberg’s mission in the final analysis was an American rather than Swedish initiative?

4 Professor Shlomo Aronson of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem has kindly pointed out to me that he has found at the National Archives, Washington, an OSS cable to Wallenberg during the siege of Budapest asking him to try and save the art collections of Ferenc Baron Hatvany, the sugar king of Hungary and an important collector. This to me is a good example of the kind of obligement one might need from a friend on the spot. The cable in question is to be found in RG 226, Entry 123, Box 2, Bern-SI-INT-14-26 and box 3, folder Hungary.

5 The exploitation of this dichotomy is of course very good for selling newspaper stories.
The notes which follow are taken from various miscellaneous investigations undertaken in the period 2004-2009. My original plan was to weave all the disparate pieces into a pleasing whole but due to a family health emergency this had to be abandoned. In retrospect, I am not sure that the value of the various bits and pieces would have been appreciably improved by serving them up in this way. The desire of the historian to produce a continuous narrative can also lead to distortions, imposing a neat, tidy structure on events but one which does not really exist.

Like most other people who work on Raoul Wallenberg, I owe a great debt to Jan Lundvik whose knowledge of the subject is surely unequalled. I am also grateful to Susan Berger, Susanne Mesinai, Vadim Birstein and Marvin Makinen for their constant and constructive criticism, often showing me the error of my ways. But there are numerous other people to whom I am indebted, not least to my chief support – the archivists in Sweden, USA, Britain, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Romania and Israel who have selflessly aided me in my detective work - as well as the many authors of historical works dealing with Hungary and the Holocaust, a subject which when I started, I knew comparatively little about.

All these estimable people have no part in the misspellings, factual errors, quixotic opinions and grave errors of punctuation which may infest the pages of these notes which were rather rapidly converted from brain storage to the necessary zeros and ones required for transmission over the internet. *Mea Culpa!*

From time to time, I have felt a certain pressure to deliver up for public consumption my findings about various bits of the puzzle I have worked on. This was particularly true of my research regarding Lolle Smit since I felt that I owed it to the memory of the man. The paper “A friend in need” is freely available on the Web. The present seminar allows me to disgorge other bits before they are swept into the waste-paper basket.

Hopefully, if nothing else, the notes provided- by the way, they constitute only a selection - will provide other interested scholars with further food for thought and some questions to investigate. I am certain that some things will come as a complete surprise. But after seventy years, it is time to air the room. As for me,
I hope thereafter to tiptoe away quietly like Minister Danielsson into the sunshine.

Craig Graham McKay

Uppsala, January 2011

Note on the contributor: Dr. C.G. McKay is primarily interested in the history of the special or secret services, mainly in the period 1900-1953. He is the author of two books in the Cass Series, Studies on Intelligence: From Information to Intrigue, Studies in Secret Service based on the Swedish Experience 1939-1945 (1993) and (with Bengt Beckman) Swedish Signal Intelligence 1900-1945 (2003). He has contributed a chapter on German Teleprinter Traffic and Swedish Wartime Intelligence to the book Colossus (Oxford: OUP, 2006). He has written numerous articles and reviews of intelligence subjects in learned journals such as The Historical Journal, Cryptologia, Journal of Intelligence History, Intelligence and National Security, Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakadmiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique. He has been invited to address specialist seminars on the history of intelligence at the universities of Glasgow, Belfast and Oxford and elsewhere. He is scheduled as guest speaker at the Bletchley Park Foundation in April of this year.
ABRAM

The circulated note of March 1945 from the Soviet Control Commission announcing the departure of Swedish diplomatic personnel and permitting Langlet and his wife to remain as private persons until 20 April, was signed by a certain Igor Spitchkin, Hotel Britannia, Budapest. As Nina Langlet pointed out in her book *Kaos I Budapest* Spitchkin “hade tidigare varit anställd vid Sovjetiska Legationen I Stockholm och talade bra svenska”. However Fru Langlet did not specify Spitchkin’s exact postion in Stockholm, either because she did not know exactly or perhaps more likely because she felt that it would be imprudent to do so. In actual fact, Spitchkin was one of the Jartsevs’ chief lieutenants in carrying out the work of the NKVD Residency in Sweden. He was often chosen to vet and maintain contacts with prospective agents and appeared in Soviet traffic under the codename ABRAM. He was for example the contact for an important agent reporting to the Russians from inside the Commercial Section of the German Legation in Stockholm. He played an important role in secret diplomacy as an intermediary in discussions with German agents and officials who sought contact with the Soviet Legation in Stockholm and was also involved in talks with the Romanians in Stockholm about the exit of Romania from the war. Spitchkin according to Swedish records arrived in Stockholm on 12 June 1942 and departed on 18 September 1944.  


8 According to the Romanian diplomat, F.D.Nano, who had dealings with Spitchkin, the latter’s appearance and manner left little to the imagination about his true profession and role.

9 Boris Jartsev (Rybkin) succeeded Andrei Grauer as Resident in 1941 until his departure in 1943. He was then temporarily succeeded by his wife who was one of the highest placed women in the service of the NKVD.

10 Mainly based on Spitchkin’s wartime files, P/53/Er 55 in UD and his Säpo PF, P4320 at Arninge. Spitchkin’s role in the Organs was confirmed by the defectors Petrov in Australia.
The possible role of Spitchkin, at the very least as an interested observer of events in Budapest in the first half of 1945, seems to have been completely overlooked in later research. In view of the above facts, however, it would be in my view be remarkable if Spitchkin was not consulted at some time on the spot in Budapest regarding the matter of Raoul Wallenberg. It is therefore desirable that UD should enquire officially of the Russian authorities whether there is material in Spitchkin’s personal file which might throw further light on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg and the grounds for his detention by the Soviet organs.

Nils Horney

Horney was a Swedish journalist writing for Social-Demokratens/Morgontidningen. In his book on Wallenberg’s mission, Professor Wilhelm Agrell has an interesting chapter dealing with attempts by the OSS agent Roy Peel to recruit Swedes—first Karl Kilbom and later the journalist Nils Horney—who would travel to Hungary for intelligence reporting tasks. The mission with Karl Kilbom failed to get off the ground but there was more success with Nils Horney. Professor Agrell notes that “Inget material har doch påträffats som närmare belyser hans uppdrag” However, this is to overlook Nils Horney’s own autobiographical reminiscences where he devotes a chapter, entitled very correctly *Hemligt Uppdrag* to his mission to Hungary.

According to Horney, Peel outlined his mission as follows. The Hungarians wished to disengage from their alliance with Hitler Germany before it was too late and therefore sought contact with the Western powers through neutral channels. However, what the Americans wished to know were the concrete

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11 Wilhelm Agrell, *Skuggor runt Wallenberg, Uppdrag i Ungern 1943-1945*, ( 

steps the Hungarians were themselves prepared to take to break the German bonds. In short, they wished to know the real strength of the opposition inside Hungary: was there a danger of over-rating its significance or were there important groups upon whom the Americans could rely? It was Horney’s task to talk to various people in Hungary and find out their opinion.

Cover for Horney’s mission was arranged by having him included in a deputation of Swedish newspaper people invited to Budapest by the Hungarian Government. Apart from Horney, the deputation included Rickard Lindström of Social-Demokraten and Carl Kreuger of Aftonbladet.

Among the people whom Horney met while in Hungary, he mentions the following: various persons connected with the Hungarian Social Democrats, notably Karoly Peyer, Anna Kethly and the editor of Nepzava, Arpad Szakasits; his interpreter, Nana Hajduk; the Peasant Leader, Zoltan Tildy; and the Jewish magnate, Baron Kornfeld. Of all the political leaders, Horney spoke too, only Tildy was prepared to wage a partisan war against the Germans. In summarizing the impressions of his visit and in effect the conclusions of his report to the OSS, Horney has this to say:

Churchill sätta in den allierade armé som hösten 1943 hade hejdats av marskalk Kesselring i Italien i en ”högerkrok mot mostsåndarens mage” över Adriatiska havet och genom Ljubljanapasset in i Ungern. President Roosevelt stödde den allierade överbefälhavaren, general Eisenhower, som ville utnyttja huvudelen av dessa trupper i den stundande invasionen i Normandie eller för en diversionsmanöver mot södra Frankrike. Churchill hade hävdat att en allierad invasion i Ungern skulle få stöd av ungerska partisaner.

Det var värdet av det påståendet det amerikanska Office of Strategic Services ville kontrollera. Den rapport jag lämnade Roy visade att den hjälp de allierad kunde vänta sig i Ungern inte var mycket värd.13

Kugel/Kugler[ first name unknown]

When Hermann Grosheim-Krisko was questioned by SMERSH in February-March 1945, it was asserted by them as evidence of the involvement of the Swedish legation in espionage activities that

der Funker Kugel habe in der KSG ein Sendergerät, mit dem er Nachrichten nach Schweden funke

The very specificity of the charge makes it interesting and worthy of careful investigation. So who was Kugel?

The answer is given in two sources- one published, the other in unpublished manuscript form. In the published source, Jonny Moser identifies him and describes his work in the following terms. Kugler was a former employee of the Hungarian Telegraph Office MTI, who was employed by Danielsson to listen to the public international broadcasting stations and to write two summaries of what had been said by way of briefing for the Minister. At Kugler's disposal was a radio receiver which allowed him to click immediately to hear any one of twelve channels of interest. By contrast, Moser makes no mention of any radio transmitter operated by Kugler.

Dora Gratz confirms Moser's description of Kugel as a former employee of MTI. She says that he was a Jew and had been so badly beaten by the Arrow Cross that his brain was affected. He temporarily


lost his sight and his speech became impaired.\textsuperscript{18} She further describes him as being initially well disposed to the Russians, but very much dismayed and embittered by their conduct when they eventually occupied the Hungarian capital.

Although one cannot obviously prove the non-existence of Kugel's radio transmitter, it seems to me an unlikely possibility. If we suppose that there was a secret radio link between the Swedish Legation in Budapest and Stockholm operated through a transmitter actually postioned in the Legation building, I suspect that its operation would be placed in the hands of a Swede rather than a foreign national about whom comparatively little was known. At the same time, it is highly plausible that Kugel's task could have been given a conspiratorial (but incorrect) interpretation by some secondary source who was unacquainted with the actual particulars of Kugel's work for Danielsson.

\textbf{Cyril Cheshire and his contact with Wallenberg and Lauer.}

In an age that has become obsessed by the CIA, it is hard for many people to realise that the US “intelligence capability” prior to the Second World War was modest, to say the least. The major European Powers—Russia, Germany, France and Britain—had all access to more impressive intelligence organisations with world wide coverage. Thus when the OSS\textsuperscript{19} was set up under Donovan, it


\textsuperscript{17} Moser mentions BBC and Radio Moscow. Gratz mentions Atlanticsender and Stockholm.

\textsuperscript{18} Gratz, op.cit., p 80.

\textsuperscript{19} The Office of Strategic Services, essentially a predecessor organisation to the CIA. The ball was set in motion with the appointment of Donovan as COI (Coordinator of Information) on July 11, 1941. A year later, after some transmutation, Donovan’s organisation became the Office of Strategic Services.
was very much “the new boy on the block” and as such relied on assistance from its British counterparts.20

Thus although I was well aware of Raoul Wallenberg’s association with Iver Olsen at the US Legation, I was also somewhat keen to explore if there had been any prior contacts with the British special services whether in the form of SOE or SIS. There was of course another reason too for my curiosity. The Wallenbergs – Marcus and Jacob- who were responsible for the family bank – had close contacts with the City of London and as the Good Book astutely puts it “ For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.” 21

My first -admittedly gratifying- find was to discover that Raoul Wallenberg and Koloman Lauer had had specific contacts with Cyril Cheshire already in 1943 and that these connections were still going strong at the end of 194422. But who was Cyril Cheshire?

At the beginning of the war, SIS activities in Sweden were in the hands of Commander ‘Pincher’ Martin, Head of the British Passport Office in Stockholm. However, in a shake-up at the end of 1942, Martin was replaced by Cyril

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20 This is not to say that the OSS, apart from certain inevitable blunders, did not soon achieve independent success. It was responsible for recruiting two of the most significant Allied agents of the war, namely Fritz Kolbe and Eduard Schulte. For Schulte, see Walter Laqueur and Richard Breitman, Breaking the Silence, (London: The Bodley Head, 1986).

21 St. Matthew VI,21. As we now know, theWallenberg Brothers enjoyed the highest possible contacts with the British intelligence establishment, in the shape of Desmond Morton who reported directly to Churchill on intelligence matters. For more details, see Ulf Olsson, Marcus Wallenberg 1899-1982 (Stockholm: Ekerlids Förlag, 2001., in particular pp.202-209.

22 On 28 October 1944, Koloman Lauer wrote to Wallenberg a letter in which he mentions continuing contact with Cheshire and expresses the hope that Cheshire will return from England with “good news”/good information” [goda underrättelser].
Cheshire. Although his declared task was passport work, the Swedish security service was already well aware of his hidden agenda before he had set to work, from their own secret sources.

Cheshire had a background in the timber business and had been born on the Finnish-Russian border. According to one German report, he had previously in the period 1940-1941 served in the SIS in Germany under the guise of being an American citizen and he was said to be a fluent speaker of Russian and German. In perusing Cheshire’s Säpo P-Dossier, I came across the following three documents which are reproduced below:

[Reproduced in original text (i) transcript of direct telephone call from Cheshire to R. Wallenberg, 12/8/43, mentioning a certain X (ii) transcript of a phone call from a “hr Wallenberg” to Cheshire, dated 24/8/43 setting up a meeting in the bar of the Riche with “herrarna Wallenberg” (iii) transcript of a phone call from Dr. Lauer to Cheshire, dated 28/8/44 announcing that Lauer and a “herr Rosenthal” would visit Cheshire the following morning at eleven to “prata om någon firma”]

My initial excitement at discovering these documents was increased (i) by the explicit mention of Cheshire in a letter from Lauer to Wallenberg on 28 October 1944 in which he writes as follows:

Med Pharaoh, Gane stå vi ävenledes i förbindelse, och Mr. Cheshire är nu på besök i sitt hemland. Vi hoppas, att han återvänder nästa vecka med goda underrättelser.

(ii) by a further telegram in coded language, this time from Wallenberg to Lauer, sent on 22 July 1944, and reporting a rumour about ongoing separate

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23 Recollect that there were two aircraft courier services between Sweden during the war, a British one operated by BOAC and a Swedish one operated by AB Aerotransport (ABA).

24 P4538, Säpo arkiv, Arninge

peace negotiations likely to imping on the fate of Hungary’s Jews. What intrigued me about the latter telegram, was that there was a name scribbled in the margin which I took to be “Cheshire”.

These discoveries led to certain speculations on my part which I later came to see were misconceived. For example, I was convinced for a time that Pharaoh, Gane was a code expression for some Nazi potentate until Susanne Berger neatly punctured this illusion by pointing out to me that Pharaoh, Gane had been a well established British firm with, for example, timber interests in Finland. Similarly my enthusiasm to read into the marginal scribble on the July telegram the name “Cheshire” was not shared by others. Vadim Birstein was not prepared to accept it and neither was a (nameless) friend in London. When I finally submitted the scribble to the professionals at Statens Kriminaltekniska Anstalt in Linköping, they too could not support my theory and pointed out that one would need far more handwriting examples to settle the matter in a scientific way. As a result, I no longer believe that it can be maintained beyond reasonable doubt that the name in the margin is Cheshire.

So where does this leave us? Well it certainly still leaves us with the three items reproduced above and to be found in Cheshire’s Säpo P-Dossier.26 The most interesting is naturally the first document since it succeeds in putting Raoul Wallenberg and Cyril Cheshire in the same frame. Who was the ‘X’ Cheshire mentions? Was the link between Mellaneuropeiska and Cheshire-between Cheshire and Messrs. Lauer and Wallenberg- based on some intelligence relationship or was it conceivable that there was some opaque commercial link?27 We simply do not know. I have been told on good authority that there is nothing in the closed archives in London to suggest any

26 An oddity of the document of the telephone tap of the conversation between RW and Cheshire is that it is to be found in Cheshire’s P-dossier but not in Raoul’s own P-dossier, P4856. The normal procedure, for obvious reasons, is to place a record in both files. Moreover, Raoul’s dossier lacks a telephone-tap section. This of course may have been removed for privacy and personal integrity reasons before the file was released to certain outside researchers. This is naturally to be regretted since such a record can supply often important clues for the historian.
intelligence link between Cheshire and Wallenberg, but like the disciple Thomas, I have not seen all these archives with my own eyes and therefore I retain a certain proper scholarly scepticism about the utility of such assurances. Moreover since I have elsewhere referred to the meeting between Lauer and Leslie Barber and my interpretation of that meeting, one naturally wonders how the information from Lauer to the British Legation was relayed and Cheshire would certainly be one possible link. On the other hand, it should also be remembered that the social world of Stockholm during the Second World War was a small intimate circle with the result that well-established families who adopted a pro-Allied stance were often in the company of American and British diplomats at social gatherings without necessarily being involved in clandestine activities. By the nature of things, suspicions arose. For example Raoul Wallenberg’s sister Nina found herself under scrutiny at UD where she was temporarily employed because of her association with one member of the British special services who aroused (rightly, it has to be confessed) the suspicions of the Swedish security service and was later forced to leave Sweden. In the world of security services, you are judged by the company you keep.

Karl-Moritz Leuvenhaupt

In Makinen/Kaplan's Final Report to The Swedish-Russian Working Party, December 15 2000, we find the following passage:

27 It is not entirely inconceivable that Cheshire with his business background in the timber trade might have been involved as a middle-man in some potential deal between a British company and Mellaneuropeiska.

28 This was Henry Threlfall of SOE who had to leave Stockholm in 1942 over a sabotage scheme in Germany mounted from Sweden which went badly wrong. Threlfall, interestingly enough, was later to head SOE's activities in Hungary. See Threlfall's file P 3778, Fahlander to Friherre K.G.Lagerfelt, 5 August 1942.
Viktor de Latry, a Swiss journalist, is reported to have stated according to the Wallenberg Files that he had knocking contact with Karl-Moritz Leuvenhaupt in the Lefortovo Prison in 1948. While de Latry clearly stated that he did not believe that Leuvenhaupt had been sent to Vladimir, it had been reported to the Swedish Foreign Ministry that there had been three Swiss prisoners and one Swedish prisoner, namely Leuvenhaupt in Korpus 3, de Latry was in the Vladimir Prison from 04/12/52 to 19/08/55 but had not heard of Leuvenhaupt there. There is no information either in the present database or in the cards photographed in 1990 about Leuvenhaupt. Susan Mesinai has requested to examine the personal dossier of Leuvenhaupt but it has not been produced.

Speculation has continued to this day about who exactly this Leuvenhaupt was and indeed whether this was his real name. The name Lewenhaupt (and its variations) is a well known and respected one in Sweden but so far no one has come forward to declare kinship with Karl-Moritz Leuvenhaupt, the mysterious prisoner held at Lefortovo Prison. It is naturally possible that Karl-Moritz was not a Swede by nationality. The present author has at least discovered independent evidence in Langlet’s archive that there was indeed a Count and Countess Lewenhaupt (initials unknown) living at Nádor utca 38, Budapest, for at least part of the Second World War and that they were known to Yngve Ekmark, formerly manager of the Swedish Match Company and subsequently attached to the Swedish legation in Budapest where he worked closely with Wallenberg.

Through a chance meeting with a source R quite recently, further information has become available to me about the Budapest Lewenhaupts. R spent his boyhood in Budapest and his parents formed part of the Swedish commercial community.[In 1944, prior to Wallenberg’s arrival, R returned to Sweden to continue his education.] According to R, the family Lewenhaupt’s sojourn in the Hungarian capital ended in 1935 with the death of Carl-Gustav Lewenhaupt in March of that year. Carl-Gustav was born in 1884 and was the Managing
Director of MAGIRT, the Hungarian subsidiary of STAB (Swedish Match). He lived with his family at Nádor utca 38 and R’s family who lived also at the same address, saw a great deal of them on an every day basis.

Carl-Gustav had three children- two sons and a daughter. The boys had already left home and they came to Budapest only on visits. The older brother was Carl Mauritz Lewenhaupt who died in 1978. According to R., to the best of his knowledge Carl Mauritz spent his whole life in Stockholm. He was fil.lic. but R did not know anything about his career. In 1945, he married Maud Friberg and they had several children.

In R.’s view, it is highly improbable that he or any other Swedish Lewenhaupt sat in a Russian prison after the war.

Remark: it is noteworthy that the name of Carl-Mauritz Lewenhaupt occurs both as that of a prisoner in Lefortovo and as that of the son of a former Swedish Match executive in Budapest. One explanation is that an unknown person for whatever reason simply assumed the latter’s identity and ended up incarcerated in Lefortovo.

John Dickinson and the missing testimony

Dickinsons kännedom om svenskt och skandinaviskt affärsliv var förmodligen rätt enastående, i varje fall för en icke skandinav, och ett samtal med honom var alltid ytterst givande.

Anna Hägglöf
“Dickinson whom I had not met before, was the quintessential expatriate Englishman. He looked straight out of a Graham Greene work. He had straight brown hair, cut longer than was then acceptable in America, he dressed unobtrusively and he smoked incessantly, a habit that led to serious consequences a few years later. He was very thoughtful and we hit it off instantly.”

A young American colleague in Stockholm

If you mention the name John Dickinson to most people carrying out research on Raoul Wallenberg, they will look at you blankly. Yet here we have something genuinely unusual, a British citizen living in Budapest in wartime and assisting Wallenberg. How on earth did such a thing come about?

John Casson Dickinson was born at Whitby in Yorkshire on 13 June 1910. His father, Henry Casson Dickinson, belonged to a Quaker banking family and Dickinson Senior finished his career as Manager of Barclay’s Bank in Northumberland. While John Dickinson’s sister was sent to The Mount School, a Quaker foundation in York, he himself was sent to Wellington College, a school closely associated with the British Army, a slightly odd choice for a Quaker family. John Dickinson trained as an accountant and was articled to the firm of Price Waterhouse in Newcastle. He would remain “a Price Waterhouse man” for the rest of his life. In 1937, he was sent to Berlin for the firm. Dickinson has left the following account of what happened next:

At the outbreak of the war I was attached to Zürich office’s staff in Bucharest having arrived there from Berlin in May 1939. At the end of 1939 I was sent to Budapest to assist the resident representative there and stayed until the summer 1940, when I was transferred to Zagreb to assist in the work which the Firm was carrying out for the British Ministry of Economic Warfare. Towards the end of 1940 it was decided by the British authorities that all allied subjects would be evacuated from the Balkans to India. During the preparations for this move, the resident representative of the Firm in Budapest was forced to leave Hungary, and

30 I am very grateful to John’s son, Mike Dickinson, for a long talk about his father and for a number of informative emails.
I was asked by the Firm whether I would volunteer to take his place. This I did, and returned to Budapest at the end of 1940.\footnote{Klas de Vylder, Price Waterhouse Sweden the first 50 years, (Stockholm:Norstedts tryckeri1982). Page 70.}

But there was perhaps one other reason why Budapest seemed a not too unpleasant option to the young man: on July 27, 1940 he had married Baroness Maria Emanuella[Ell] Erzsebet Teleki, a member of a well known aristocratic Hungarian family, after a whirlwind romance.\footnote{The family included Count Paul Teleki, Prime Minister of Hungary from 1937 until 1941,}

Dickinson would now remain in the Balkans for the rest of the war. But for some time- a surprisingly long time in fact – it was business, more or less as usual:

From 1941 to 1944 I was at liberty to carry out work in Budapest and in fact did a number of assignments for the Firm in each of the three years, the reports being sent out in the normal way until diplomatic relations were broken off between Hungary and the United States and thereafter they were sent to Sweden by devious routes.

During the summers of 1941, 1942 and 1943 I spent a number of months on my wife’s small farm in Transylvania, returning to Budapest in the autumn of each year.\footnote{Klas de Vylder, Price Waterhouse Sweden the first 50 years, (Stockholm:Norstedts tryckeri1982). Page 70.}

In Hungary, Price Waterhouse had three main accounts which Dickinson worked on: Shell, IBM and MAGIRT, the Hungarian subsidiary of Swedish Match [STAB]. But by 1942, only MAGIRT remained and it was this last account for a Swedish company which kept the Dickinson family financially afloat\footnote{Dickinson was able to spend several months every summer in the period 1941-1943 at his wife’s farm in Transylvania.} during the war years and forged a link with Sweden which would last.
The German invasion of Hungary produced a radical change. As Dickinson recounts:

After the occupation of the country by the German army in the spring of 1944, I ceased to do any work for the account of the Firm and after a short holiday I attached myself to the Swedish Red Cross and set up, on their suggestion, an organisation to register the names of Jews who had been deported to Germany or to Poland by the SS. This organisation grew considerably and in the end I was responsible for employing some forty people, all of whom, with one or two exceptions, were Jews. The work with the Swedish Red Cross ceased in October 1944 when the Hungarian Nazis took over the government, and it was necessary to go into hiding.

After living in hiding under various assumed names for some time, I joined Raoul Wallenberg’s organisation, which had been set up by the Swedish Government to assist the Jews in Hungary by granting them temporary Swedish nationality. I remained with Wallenberg’s organisation until the final stage of the siege of Budapest, when, after having been wounded, I was moved into the Swedish legation until the German armed forces in Budapest capitulated to the Soviets in February 1945.

In due course I began to start the Firm’s practice in Budapest once more and remained there until 1946 when I was recalled to London and later transferred to Sweden.35

Some comments are worth making on the above. With regard to the business of false names which he mentions, what happened was that his friend Dora Gratz, the daughter of a former Hungarian Foreign Minister, came to his aid.36 Dora had been married to an Austrian. After the *Anschluss*, the

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36 I take this point up because it is relevant to know that the false documentation was obtained through a private Hungarian source rather than through a foreign intelligence service.
Austrian had divorced his wife and Dora returned with her four children to live with her parents in Budapest. But she happened to have her former husband’s identity papers and these Dickinson now “borrowed” supplemented by a counterfeit Swiss passport acquired from a Jew in Budapest, which he could use to explain his difficulties with the Hungarian language and his curious German accent. In another twist, the young Michael Dickinson was presented as the illegitimate son of one of the maids.37

Secondly, in his work with Langlet in registering missing Jews, he worked closely with Kutuzov-Tolstoy with whom he seems to have got on rather well.38

Thirdly, in the final phase of the siege of Budapest, Dickinson was formally asked by Danielsson to take charge of the abandoned Legation building including its safes, but refused to do.39 In the event, the task was given to Danielsson’s chauffeur40.

Finally, a valuable record of this final phase is to be found in Dora Gratz’s unpublished journal of events. It is written in German and complements other purely Swedish accounts although it offers few startling surprises.41 A copy of this manuscript was generously given to me by Professor Lóránt Kabdebó, Miskolc42. Another copy was handed over to UD at my suggestion on a later occasion.

37 This detailed information from Mike Dickinson.


39 See Valdemar Langlet, Verk och Dagar i Budapest (Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 1946.) See page 188. The reason was that Dickinson did not get on well with Margareta Bauer who had been heard to describe Dickinson and Gratz as “ett par tjuvar”.
As John Dickinson records in Klas de Vylder’s book, after the war he took up a position with Price Waterhouse in Sweden. His first period of service was from 1946 until the summer of 1949 when he moved to Copenhagen. But after a short spell in Copenhagen, he returned to Stockholm once again, this time as head of the Stockholm Office in succession to John Stevenson.

It was in Stockholm too that Dickinson died in 1962, a much respected man. Obituaries appeared in the leading Swedish dailies, including one in *Svenska Dagbladet* by Anna Hägglöf, the wife of the diplomat Gunnar Hägglöf. Shortly before his death, he was awarded an OBE by Queen Elisabeth.

The only known witness statement from Dickinson about his work with Wallenberg, is that reproduced in the attached document. It belongs to the period when Dickinson was in Copenhagen and is essentially a summary of a

40 Josef Dévényi. About this man, Dora Gratz makes the following interesting observation which is worth noting: “John [Dickinson] war in der Schweizerischen Gesandtschaft und hat mit Danielson gesprochen. Als John leiste Zweifel über die Verlässlichkeit Josefs des Chauffeurs äusserte, den der Gesandte mit der Leitung der Gesandtschaft betraut hatte, sagte Danielson, dass er Volles Vertrauen zu Josef habe. Er ist nun, wo noch mehrere gebildete Gesandtschaftsangestellte vorhanden sind, ein ziemlich unmöglicher Zustand, dass ein Chauffeur, noch dazu ein alles eher, als vertrauendwürdiges Element und ein früherer Nyilas über die restlichen Personen gestellt sein soll. Diese Entscheidung des Gesandte wird von der Leute, die ihn besser kennen darauf zurückgeführt, dass dieser Chauffeur in seine Herzenangelegenheiten voll eingeweiht war und dass sich Danielson nun nicht traut gegen ihn energisch vorzugehen. Ob das war ist, oder nicht, mag dahingestellt bleiben, die Tatsachen sind jedenfalls äussert eigentümlich und der Zustand auf die Queer nich haltbar:” Journal, p. 98-99. In a Bilaga to a Report to UD, dated 16 June 1945 (copy in Langlet’s archive) Langlet describes Dévényi as “en mycket skum figur, vilken länge tjänat som spion ”. In the book *Nätter på Savoy* (Stockholm:Carlssons Bokförlag, 1988) – a book which incidentally makes the startling, novel but otherwise totally unconfirmed claim that Raoul Wallenberg had some kind of clandestine contact with Alexandra Kollontay, the Soviet Minister in Stockholm, prior to going to Hungary- Iwo Wiklander claims that he was told by Khrushchev’s interpreter in a conversation at the UN in New York that Dévényi had been a Soviet agent who had delivered highly compromising evidence of Danielsson’s desire for a German victory during the war. Wiklander’s claims appear to have passed unnoticed in scholarly discussions. When I have drawn the attention of various Swedish experts on Raoul Wallenberg to Wiklander’s account, the response has been to dismiss his book as a work of imagination and literary fabrication rather than of serious testimony. For more on Danielsson, see my essay “What happened in Cairo?” now available on the Web.

41 Her portraits of people are on the other hand rather interesting.

42 I had assisted Professor Kabdebó with information about Dickinson which is included in his book *Szabó Lőrinc >>Pere<<* (Miskolc: Argumentum, 2006).-
conversation with Beck-Friis in the Danish capital. This is in some ways surprising. John Dickinson’s son has informed me that when Dickinson arrived in Stockholm from London directly after the war, he was called in to UD and interviewed about what had happened in Budapest. But no record of such an interview has been found.

Not surprisingly, there are many rumours to the effect that John Dickinson was a British spy in Hungary during the Second World War. In some cases, the reasoning behind these rumours can shown to be faulty. Thus the award of the OBE to Dickinson was due not to some supposed contribution to British espionage in Hungary during the war, but to his contribution to Anglo-Swedish relations much later and his considerable work on behalf of the English Church and English School in Stockholm. Nonetheless it has to be said that Dickinson was certainly well placed to gather information in Hungary. He had excellent connections and he also seems to have had a commercial channel of communication to Switzerland at his disposal as well as the “devious routes” to Sweden which he himself alludes to. Connections and a hidden channel of communication are of course the Alpha and Omega in the life of the spy. It is perhaps not irrelevant that at an earlier stage of the war, he undertook work in Zagreb on behalf on the MEW. Michael Dickinson is convinced that his father was engaged in some secret work when he was in Hungary. On the other hand, there are counterarguments which have to be addressed: for example, how likely is it, even allowing for the strapped finances of HM Government after the war, that Grandfather Dickinson would have had to pay for the flight of Dickinson and family home to England immediately after the war, if Dickinson had been an important British spy?

[UD document dated 25/4/51 from Beck-Friis, Copenhagen to UD prefacing a PM about a conversation with Dickinson about RW]

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43 Mike Dickinson has said that when on one occasion the claim was made in a Hungarian work that Dickinson had been a spy, his mother had agreed that this was true.

44 It was Mike Dickinson who told me about the grandfather’s intervention in advancing the money to pay for the flight.
Herbert Caird North

The name Herbert North occurs occasionally in the Raoul Wallenberg saga as the man at the British Legation, Stockholm who received Wallenberg’s reports. It is a name quite well known to me since I was in contact with him in the 1980s when I was writing my book *From Information to Intrigue* (1993). The contact came about through Peter Tennant, a mutual friend and former British Press Attaché. I am sorry to say that not once in my correspondence with Herbert North did the name of Raoul Wallenberg crop up! I was at that time concerned with quite different matters: what I was interested in hearing from Herbert was simply his inside view of the work of the Press Reading Bureau (PRB) in Stockholm where he functioned essentially as Cecil Parrot’s deputy. His primary task was to keep things running smoothly, no small task given that he was in charge of a multi-lingual bunch of European intellectuals. Vilmos Böhm was one of those involved in this work: quite a minor position in fact and not at all anything like the rather grand status of Press Attaché. The same bunch, nonetheless, performed splendidly in scouring the pages of obscure newspapers, trades papers, journals— you name it— for unintended titbits of information lurking in obituaries and elsewhere which when gathered together and linked to other material, allowed one to fill in the intelligence picture of the enemy camp— its losses, its present state and if possible perhaps something of its intentions. “The product”— to use contemporary intelligence terminology— of the PRB had a fairly wide distribution in London. Its main customer department

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45 See in particular pp. 101-106 of that book dealing with the Press Reading Bureau. In footnote 125 to that text, I acknowledge help from Herbert North.

46 On page 12 of RAOUl WALLENBERG, Historik och nya forskningsfält, Göran Rydeberg wrongly labels Böhm “pressattachén”. 
was PID, the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, but the product was also found useful by Military Intelligence people at the War Office. In short, it was a very good example of OSINT – Open Source Intelligence - long before that acronym had been invented.

Herbert North, to the best of my knowledge, had nothing whatsoever to do with the British Secret Services. He had too much on hand with his assignment at the PRB. Needless to say, he associated with intelligence people all the time. Who didn’t in the world of wartime diplomacy? Someone like Böhm was, by contrast, cultivated to some extent by the British secret service for obvious reasons: he had a wide range of contacts, he could feed back on occasion useful information and not least, it was just as well to keep track on what he was up to. [The British were, of course, well aware of Böhm’s past and to some extent of his contacts with the Soviet Legation. When later there was a suggestion from Parrot that Böhm should move to London, the Foreign Office turned it down.]

The point to be made is that that the PRB was a natural channel for the incoming reports from Wallenberg. They were of great interest to the readership of PRB’s material but although confidential, they were not looked upon as excessively secret demanding special handling. In short any attempt to cast Herbert North in the role of hidden conspirator is likely to end in failure.

Raoul’s Train Project

On July 25, 1944, a telegram arrived at the office of Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, Washington from Hershel Johnson, the US Minister in Stockholm. It reads (in part) as follows:

Following information has been received indirectly from Wallenberg in Budapest. This is number 594 WRB.

47 The thinness of Herbert North’s Security Police file, P3585, tends to support this.
(One) Prospects appear favorable for evacuation to Sweden of 650 Jews in Hungary who possess Swedish papers of one kind or other. Both Hungarians and Germans are reported to have expressed willingness in principle to let this group leave for Sweden but problem remains of securing German transit permits and transportation to Sweden. Local circles appear optimistic on these points. There were between sixty and seventy of foregoing group who have been deported and so far efforts have been unsuccessful in determining their whereabouts. Swedish Foreign Office is being requested by local Mosaic community to press German Government regarding these missing Jews. 48

(Two) Prospects also appear favorable for devacuation to Sweden of 200 Jewish children under ten years old. Both Hungarian and German authorities are reported to have assented to offer of local Mosaic coimmunity to take these children in Sweden. Transportation details not worked out as yet.

The project of arranging a train to take Jews *en bloc* to Sweden would remain one that was dear to the heart of Wallenberg. In his memoir, *Verk och Dagar I Budapest*, Langlet has devoted a passage to this project and at the same time explains the real obstacle that the Germans placed- at least initially- in the way of its practical implementation, namely the quid pro quo demanded:

Bland annat hade vi det gemensamma intresset att försöka rädda över till Sverige, temporärt och tills den efterlängtade freden äntligen inträdde, dels några hundratal föräldralösa judiska barn, för vilka de mosaiska religionssamfunden i Stockholm och Göteborg telegrafiskt erbjudit gästfrihet, och dels likaledes några hundra vuxna personer, som ägde familje- eller affärssförbindelser i vårt land och fördenskull icke behövde ligga myndigheterna och välfärdsinstitutioner till last.

Genom våra förbindelser i trafikministeriet och järnvägsstyrelsen hade vi kommit så långt, att ett helt tåg stod berett att avgå till Sassnitz och sedemera pendla mellan Budapest och den svenska färjelinjen under kommando av ungerska trafiktjänstemän. Man behövde så att sätta blott trycka på en knapp för att sätta saken igång. Men allt berodde på tyskt beviljande av genomresetillstånd. Och icke ens Raoul Wallenberg med sin ställning som diplomat, sina mycket rikliga penningsmedel och sin otroliga iver och energi lyckades härvid komma längre än att man på tyska legationen emottog bortåt 300 för ungerska judar utfärtrade svenska provisoriska pass i väntan på slutgiltigt avgörande. För mind del hade jag

48 State Cable #2779, Hungarian, No. 2-C, 34, War Refugee Board archive, Roosevelt Library.
The question, however, is whether this was quite the full story: there was perhaps another part which Langlet knew nothing about.

It seems to me that Kastner/Kasztner, that much criticized man, may have left us a clue:


Schließlich scheiterte der ganze Plan jedoch durch den plötzlichen Vorstoß der Russen”]

For some time, I have meditated on this passage. There seems to be nothing recorded about this negotiation with Becher and one would dearly know a bit more about it. One of the most interesting aspects is the timing: it seem that these negotiations took place relatively late in the year. Another interesting feature is that the Germans required that Kastner and his Jewish friends should underwrite any agreement.

At the same time, I was made aware by at least one wise critic that perhaps one should be wary of relying too heavily on what Kastner said. After all, he had his own agenda in the light of the criticisms levelled against him after the war. By hitching his own train to Wallenberg’s, so to speak, he might hope to


improve his standing. Nonetheless I am persuaded that Kastner probably told the truth. My reason is simply that his companion Andreas Biss has offered what seems to be confirmation of the story, both in terms of what he says and in particular in a telegram which he provides. He provides what seems to me a plausible explanation of why the German side demanded that Wallenberg’s scheme should be underwritten: they simply believed that there was a secret Jewish organisation which controlled the world and with which Kastner and his friends were in touch. If this organisation gave its go-ahead, then the money would be delivered. Here is the relevant passage in Biss:

[Omitted: image of the relevant passage from Biss which shows that a telegram was actually sent to Sally Mayer in Switzerland at the beginning of December 1944, asking for his guarantee of the scheme hatched between Becher and Wallenberg]  

It seems to me very desirable to know a bit more about this deal particularly how the money to the German side was to be paid out. It undoubtedly fell through for practical reasons and came too late in the day when the Russians were already knocking on the door. But that does not detract from the interest in knowing what was planned. Note that the telegram according to Biss was sent to Mayer at the beginning of December 1944. Finally how much did the Russians find out about the deal?

Notes on Mellaneuropeiska

[Omitted: images of two documents from Socialstyrelsens arkiv relating to Lauer. The first is an application from Lauer, incoming 6 October 1941, for a work permit, countersigned by Raoul Wallenberg for Mellaneuropeiska Handels AB. The second is a letter from Raoul Wallenberg dated 21 May 1942, complementing Lauer’s applications for Residence and Work permits. It sets out a remarkable statement over the the value of goods imported by Mellaneuropeiska during the

51 Andreas Biss, Der Stopp der Endlösung, Kampf gegen Himmler und Eichmann in Budapest (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1966), pages 226-227.
period October 1941-May 1942 ie 8 months]. This amounted in toto to 2 million 210 thousand crowns. The biggest single item was poultry [fågel] at Skr 1.400.000]

The above two documents are to me very fascinating for they help to correct two assumptions that are readily made by people writing about RW and Lauer. There is first of all the idea that RW got a job UNDER Lauer; the second is that there couldn’t have been much money to make in the poultry, breast of goose and tomato ketchup business during the war. Think again!

In order to understand the relationship between RW and Lauer, it is necessary to know something about the setting up of the firm and curiously enough this is something which has been rather neglected. There is a good reason for this. As far as I have discovered, Mellaneuropeiska’s commercial archive has disappeared from the earth’s surface. (I am grateful to hear from anyone who knows that this statement to be false.) What we have is the selected correspondence between Lauer and RW now preserved in Riksarkivet in the RW archive. But this is a very small part of what must have been a considerable archive of business correspondence, financial statement etc covering the years 1941 to 1945. Did Lauer simply burn it up or did someone do it for him? Nonetheless a certain amount of basic information about Mellaneuropeiska (Meropa) is to be found in the archive of Patent-och registreringsverket at Riksarkivet and it is this which I have made use of in the narrative which follows.

The history of Mellaneuropeiska is essentially this. In the beginning was the Banana line [Bananlinjen], a company with a share capital of 30,000 crowns presided over by a three man board, consisting of Carl Mathiessen, Ernst Holmström and Sven Salén, the shipping line owner. The latter can be
considered the real power behind the throne.\textsuperscript{52} According to the Register of Joint Stock Companies, Banana Line Ltd. aimed at being a shipping and freight company involved in trade and related commercial activities. But on 25 July 1941, undoubtedly because of the difficulties involved in importing bananas in wartime, the company metamorphosed into the Mellaneuropeiska Trading Company, which sought, according to its articles, “to engage in import and export between Sweden and the Central European countries, particularly Hungary”. Shortly before the launch of the transfigured company, – on 21 June 1941 according to the Police Register of the movements of aliens –, Dr. Koloman Lauer had travelled to Leksand to meet Sven Salén, presumably with the object of confirming his position as the person entrusted with the day-to-day running of the enterprise and discussing the trading possibilities which lay ahead. The impression often conveyed that Lauer was the owner of Meropa and that Wallenberg was his employee is quite mistaken.\textsuperscript{53}

The fact is that whereas by the end of September 1941, Raoul Wallenberg had become a board member and shareholder of the trading company, Lauer neither owned shares nor sat on the board at this time. It was only at the end of June 1944, shortly before he was granted Swedish citizenship, that Lauer was appointed to the board of Mellaneuropeiska Handelsbolag. The issue of Lauer’s citizenship was crucial and in his application to Socialstyrelsen, the real pecking order is revealed: it is Raoul

\textsuperscript{52} Salén was of course in turn very much dependent on his bankers, the Wallenberg brothers.

\textsuperscript{53} Patent –och registreringsverket, RA, Stockholm. See File 39279 dealing with Aktiebolaget Bananlinjen, and Mellaneuropeiska Handelsaktiebolaget
who endorses Lauer’s visa application in October 1941 and who sends in the supplementary financial details about the company in May 1942.

Having said that, it is nonetheless clear that it was Lauer who from the start was *practically* responsible for the day to day running of the company and possessed the trade contacts and branch knowledge which was necessary for running the business successfully.

**Who exactly was Dr. Lauer?**  

Kőloman Lauer was born on 5 July 1899 at Szinerválja, Hungary (now Seini in Romania). The Swedish archives have very little to say about his career prior to his arrival in Sweden. According to one source of information (Rudolph Philipp), Lauer who was said to have been a communist in his youth, had for a time worked in Hamburg as a lawyer involved in various commercial ventures before moving first to Holland and later to Sweden. These later moves had been orchestrated with the help of one of Lauer’s boyhood friends and fellow countrymen, Stefan Iván and it was partly because of his association with Iván, that Lauer first became of interest to the Swedish security service.

Stefan Iván had arrived in Sweden in the mid 1930s, seeking political sanctuary, after running foul of the Gestapo in Germany, where he had apparently been in the habit of writing for various Social Democratic publications. But no sooner had he arrived in Sweden than he was off again.

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54 The information in this appendix, unless otherwise stated, comes from the files P 3030 (Lauer) and P 792 (Ivan) in the archives of the Swedish security service, RA (Arninge).
on 4 November 1936, first to Paris and then to Spain to participate actively against Franco in the Civil War, serving first as a mechanic in the International Brigade’s air division in Northern Spain and latterly in the infantry. Ivan’s period in the army was short. Wounded in battle shortly after Christmas 1936, he was hospitalized in Valencia until his return to Sweden in 1937 where he was treated at Sabbatsberg Hospital in Stockholm.

Once back in Sweden, Iván worked for a time at an institution for the crippled and toyed with an idea, suggested apparently by the lawyer George Branting,55 of establishing a similar kind of establishment in Barcelona. This idea was dropped after the fall of that city to Franco. Iván was then forced to look for alternatives and eventually became involved in a series of small import-export ventures in the game and poultry branch where he was responsible for foreign correspondence and contacts. Under Swedish law, as a stateless refugee, Iván was in no position to be the legal owner of these firms. However the security police who clearly kept an eye on Iván, had an interesting comment to make about these commercial exploits:

> It would not seem to be an exaggeration to say that the aforementioned firms of Skandinaviska Export och Import and Elisabeth Lundgren’s firm are owned by Iván and Lauer, where it is probably Lauer who is the principal party.

Thus Lauer enters the Swedish scene as a man involved in a less than transparent commercial operation involving dummy placeholders. He was essentially a man living outside the country, paying occasional visits to

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55 George Branting, the son of Sweden’s first Social Democratic Prime Minister, was well to the left of social democracy and he often acted as a legal counsellor both for communists who got in trouble with the Swedish authorities and for the Soviet Legation in Stockholm. For more on Branting, see Wilhelm Agrell, op.cit., Chap 28, “Senator- det ambivalenta förråderiet”.
Sweden and making use of Iván and others as commercial fronts inside the country. The police noted that

Lauer has an extensive telegram correspondence and several of these telegrams are sent with the telegram address “Dunord”\(^{56}\) by Iván. Investigation shows that Lauer’s commercial operations are extensive.

In connection with this telegram traffic, there was another small but interesting feature noted by the security service.

It has been observed that Ivan at the telegram address “Dunord” ……has received a telegram from Åbo which consists purely of numbers.\(^{57}\)

At the beginning of 1940, Iván’s wife who was a Swedish citizen, started up yet another new company called Divarex, which was involved in the import-export trade between Sweden on the one hand and Hungary/Romania on the other. It is reasonable to suppose that Lauer was behind this venture as well. A year later, Divarex was bought up by the Mellaneuropeiska Trading Company, the Salén company with which both Lauer and later Raoul Wallenberg would be connected.

What are we to make of all this? There is little doubt from his dossier that the Security Service considered Iván as a possible Comintern agent posing as a social democrat and working

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\(^{56}\) This was the telegram address of Skandinaviska Export och Import.

\(^{57}\) The assumption of the Security Service was undoubtedly that this was a cypher telegram from a possible (Soviet) controller based in Finland.
simultaneously under commercial cover. On several occasions Ivan had declared himself to be a communist “fighting for the cause”. He had given proof of this by his active engagement in the Spanish Civil War. In addition, there was his association with Georg Branting; and there was the numbers telegram from Finland. After the war, a further interesting fact would emerge. It transpired that in 1940, Iván had acquired a property on the outskirts of Stockholm where he had some kind of mysterious radio. This radio was later lent to an unnamed acquaintance in 1943, only to be returned when the war was over.

If the Swedish Security Service looked upon Iván as a possible Soviet asset, their picture of Ivan’s associate Lauer was rather different. One is left in little doubt that Otto Danielsson, the spycatcher, took a very negative view of Lauer as his memoranda on the subject make abundantly clear. To Danielsson, Lauer was essentially a smart, Central European businessman, who was happiest when earning money through a shady deal. But was this an unbiassed assessment or did it feed on Danielsson’s own prejudices when confronting a man like Lauer? Was there an element of envy precipitated by Lauer’s income and undoubted commercial abilities? No doubt Lauer was prepared to bend the rules somewhat and chance his arm in clinching a deal, but was he so very different from many of his Swedish counterparts in the same line of business?

Whatever the truth of the matter, Otto Danielsson’s suspicions were strengthened and eagerly confirmed by one of his sources,

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58 In 1943, his taxable income was 21,200 crowns. In 1949, it was 50,900 and two years later it had risen to 52,580. According to Professor Lars Magnusson, Department of Economic History, Uppsala, a person having such an income can be described as being “extremely well-off”. By comparison, a lower civil servant in 1943 had to make do with 500-600 crowns per month before deductions.
Rudolph Philipp, who was only too pleased to feed the policeman one snippet of information after the other, designed to chip away at Lauer’s reputation. Not the least of Lauer’s later sins in Philipp’s eyes was that he had tried to put a stop to Philipp’s attempt to find out the truth about Raoul Wallenberg and had even gone so far as to offer Philipp twenty thousand crowns if he were prepared to do so.

But back to the war. After Lauer’s appointment as day to day manager of the Mellaneuropeiska Trading Company in 1941, his relations with Ivan seem to have faded away. He became engrossed in his business affairs, undertaking visits to Budapest.

However, a new problem was about to arise. On 7 December 1941, Britain, mainly as a sop to its Russian ally, declared war on Hungary, Rumania and Finland. This meant that Mellaneuropeiska Trading Company ran the risk of ending up on the British Statutory List - commonly called the Black List - on account of its trading with the enemy. Indeed this happened on 2 March 1942. But then something interesting happened. Lauer explained the circumstances to the Allied High Commission Permit Office for Germany in January 1950 after his application for an entry permit to Germany had been turned down.

59 Philipp wrote the first major article about Wallenberg’s humanitarian work in Budapest and his disappearance. In the postwar period, he operated in close cooperation with Raoul Wallenberg’s closest relatives to bring pressure on the Swedish Government to take more vigorous action on behalf of the missing Swedish diplomat. Although a learned and often insightful man, Philipp’s personality was such that he often alienated the very people whose assistance he required. Through his role as ‘expert’ on the Wallenberg case, Philipp found himself on several occasions brought into contact with spycatcher Otto Danielsson.
[in] 1942 it came to a gentlemen’s agreement between Mr. L.C. S. Barber\textsuperscript{60} of the British legation, Stockholm, and myself that AB MEROPA should carry on business in the most loyal way and in accordance with the regulations of war. This agreement has been strictly observed by us, and Mr. Barber expressed his thanks for our loyal co-operation during the war time, which you will see from the two letters from Mr. Barber attached to our letter of April 29, 1946 to the British Legation, Stockholm, attention Mr. Berner.

According to the Swedish Security Service, Meropa was removed from the Black List on 11 December 1942. In effect, the company was officially on the Statutory List for almost a year. The question which naturally arises is simply this: how did MEROPA show its loyalty to the Allied Cause? What kind of quid pro quo was demanded in return for removing the company from the Black List? It is at this stage, one imagines, that the likely solution would have been to allow MEROPA to continue with its trade connections with Hungary in return for providing economic and other information of use to the Allies in their prosecution of the war.

Moving forward to the end of the war, it is interesting to note that Lauer was seeking to establish business contacts with Russia at the end of 1944. In a letter to Raoul Wallenberg, dated 28 November 1944\textsuperscript{61}, he writes as follows:

\textsuperscript{60} Leslie Barber was Commercial Attaché at the British Legation. His security police file P2819 reveals nothing of interest.

\textsuperscript{61} In Vol I:6 of the Wallenbergföreningarkivet in RA, Marieberg.
We [presumably MEROPA] have conducted several negotiations with the Russian Trade Delegation here in Stockholm. If you are unable to leave in time, you will have to travel via Russia, Moscow and it would be fine if you could carry out some investigations for us there. I enclose copies of our correspondence with the Russian Trade Delegation. In the meanwhile, I have ordered 1000 kg of caviare for Christmas if the order be guaranteed to reach us in time.

It is not entirely out of the question that I too may come to Moscow when you are there, but I cannot promise anything definite since the formalities involve certain difficulties.

These trade discussions between Lauer and the Russian Trade Delegation also figure in a long letter from Lauer to Marcus Wallenberg on 20 March 1945, designed to clarify for the recipient the background to Raoul’s mission and also to offer reassurance regarding his disappearance. Lauer notes that a telegram from the Russians has been sent to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, saying that Raoul is under Russian protection and adds:

From the above, one can conclude that Raoul has arrived in good shape at the Russians who are not going to allow him to come to any harm since both he personally and his mission have aroused their deepest sympathy. An official at the Russian Trade Delegation told me this in November last year.

One naturally wonders what Lauer told the Russians about Wallenberg and his mission. Is it possible for example that in his general enthusiasm to do business, he might have confided more than was prudent about Wallenberg and his various connections?
Finally, in the immediate postwar period, there was a rumour recorded by the Swedish security service to the effect that Lauer had provided material support in chartering a plane to enable certain Hungarian communist refugees to return to their native land from Sweden in order to participate in the restructuring of their country. It is not easy to evaluate what there was of actual substance in this claim. Other rumours, studiously recorded by Otto Danielsson, charged Lauer with having smuggled out various valuables from Hungary to South America\textsuperscript{62} and of having made, through Red Cross contacts, huge and unreasonable profits in transporting food and assistance to refugees in postwar Europe\textsuperscript{63}. Lauer’s answer to all this was that he had merely been the object of ill-willed gossip by commercial competitors, intended to damage his reputation in the eyes of Swedish and foreign governments. For his implacable opponent, Rudolph Philipp, he remained a man “who was prepared to serve any government, whether red, black or no colour at all, provided that he Lauer could make money on the deal”\textsuperscript{64}.

\textbf{Henrik de Wahl}

Other important contacts have been made with respect to Hungarian problems. These include former Hungarian Minister here who refused to recognize the present régime in Hungary resulting from German Occupation. Also includes

\textsuperscript{62} Danielsson, PM. 28 January 1950 in Lauer’s dossier.

\textsuperscript{63} Danielsson, PM. 28 January 1950 in Lauer’s dossier. This is a separate PM, not identical to the immediately foregoing one,
Heinrich Dewahl [sic], director of Manfred-Weise[sic]-Stahlwerk, who arrived in Sweden two days before German occupation. Have found Swede who is going to Hungary in very near future on business trip and who appears willing to lend every possible assistance on Hungarian problems. Am having dinner with him on June 11 with Wahl, for purpose of exploring possibilities and to obtain in some measure his capabilities along those lines. Any instructions which would coordinate approach to Hungarian problem would be helpful.65

Thus Herschel Johnson in a despatch to Washington, essentially setting the scene for the run up to the selection of RW for the mission to Budapest. And there right at the very beginning is the figure of Henrik de Wahl. Although comparatively little research has been dedicated to digging out details on Kolman Lauer, there would seem to be even less known about Henrik de Wahl.

However, thanks to Socialstyrelsen:s arkiv a skeleton portrait- with one striking surprise- emerges.

De Wahl, who as we shall presently see, had Swedish business interests, arrived in Sweden on August 20, 1943. During this period, his health deteriorated markedly and he ended by spending his time partly at the Hotel at Saltsjöbaden and partly at the Red Cross Hospital. At once stage, it was feared that he had stomach cancer but this turned out to be a false alarm. On December 12, 1943, he returned to Hungary. But not to stay. On March 13, 1944, de Wahl came back to Sweden, hoping to further recuperate from his illness and at the same time to marry Elisabeth Ugglæ, daughter to Major John R. Ugglæ and Baroness Carin Barnekow. Now in Sweden, he hoped to pursue his business interests.

So what were Wahl’s business interests and what in fact was his business background? A document66 in Socialstyrelsen:s arkiv provides us with the following information.

64 Danielsson, PM. 28 January 1950 in Lauer’s dossier. Identical with PM of note 48.

65 State Cable #2098, Hungary, No. 2-C, Box 34, WRB’s archive, Roosevelt Library.
From 1928 until 1938 he was a director of Ungarische Luftverkehrs A.G, which explains why Captain Florman of ABA appears in his list of sponsors. He and Florman were old colleagues. In 1938, he became a Director of Manfred Weiss Stahl- und Metallwerke A.G, one of the giants of Hungarian industry, and among whose founders were numbered both de Wahl’s uncle, Baron Manfred Weiss and his father Oscar Ritter von Wahl.

But now comes the surprise.

Manfred Weiss also owned Hungary’s largest cannery [konservfabrik] and in 1939, Henrik de Wahl took part in founding Svenska Konserv AB Globus in Malmö which was half owned by his family (read Manfred Weiss) and half by the Swedish Banankompaniet.

This means that there was in fact a commercial link between Manfred Weiss on the one hand and Meropa since the Lauer-Wallenberg enterprise was tied at the stomach to Banankompaniet. This connection is one which deserves further investigation, particularly by an economic historian.

Why?

Well, there is an amazing claim to be found in Rudolph Philipp’s old book on RW where he writes as follows:

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66 Summary entitled Betr. Henrik Ritter von Wahl, född i Budapest den 12.8.1897 and appended to an application from de Wahl asking for an extension of his Residence Permit and certain other privileges.
What is dynamite in this claim is summed up in the words “med dr Lauers hjälp under de senaste åren kunnat placera stora värden i svenska företag. Vid denna tid var han mest intresserad för att koncernen efter krigets slut skulle kunna återgå i familiens ägo.”

So the questions arise: (a) where did the money come from which was being invested in Swedish companies (b) in which companies was it being invested. (a) is easier to answer than (b). The money presumably came from part of the Manfred Weiss empire in Hungary which very shortly would be taken over by the SS on a twenty-five year lease under which time the new managers could more or less do what they liked, with Becher (among others) orchestrating the affair on the ground. 68

Now if the above claim is true- and of course this will have to be double checked- it would mean that Lauer in addition to dealing with the imports of food was also essentially acting as a “cloak” [bulvan] for Manfred Weiss.

Now what we know from Lauer’s letter to Wallenberg on 28 October 1944, is that Lauer was very much preoccupied with the affairs of Globus. According to him, however, this firm rested on an insecure basis, adding:

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The clearest presentation of this subject, in my view, is the article by George Hoff, The Manfred Weiss-SS Deal of 1944, Hungarian Studies 7/1-2 1991/92. Hof acted as legal counsel for Manfred Weiss.
De bägge fabrikernas produktionsprogram omfattar ungefär för två miljoner kronor färdig vara, och du kan nog förstå, att jag ligger sömlöslös ibland och tänker på, vilka överraskningar morgonen kommer med och från vilken sida de komma.

But Lauer was not the only one to be interested in the fortunes of Globus and Banankompaniet. There were always those who were secretly keeping tabs on possible cloaking operations and less than transparent affairs:

[Document from the Ministry of Economic Warfare to the Commercial Secretariat, Stockholm, dated 23 March, 1945, darwing to a letter read by the British authorities from M.Uggla, Stockholm to Edith Weiss, Portugal (by this time several members of the Weiss family were in Portugal) apparently announcing that the Banan Company Stockholm had now gone into liquidation.]

If Henrik de Wahl was salting away money from the Manfred Weiss Group in Swedish companies to avoid it following into SS hands, then it need not be that Lauer was the principal instrument in all of these manipulations. Henrik de Wahl was well placed to act on his own behalf. He had permission from the Swedish authorities to run the affairs of A.B. Banankompaniet in Stockholms Frihamn (to which he had access) and those of Globus at Limhamn. The Socialstyrelse summary from which we have already quoted from, adds an interesting gloss on de Wahl’s future plans:

“H. von Wahl deltager nu i förhandlingarna med de härvarande industrkretsarna, som förbereda efterkriegspogrammet för handelsutbytet Sverige Ungern. – För närvarande står han i förbindelse med följande förmor:

Svenska Kullager Fabriken, Göteborg,
A.B. Elektrolux, Stockholm
Lidköpings Mek. Verkstad, Lidköping,
AB Ahlsell & Bernström, Stockholm
H von Wahl kan leva här i landet på inomsterna från Svensk Konserv AB Globus och står under finansiellt skydd av Banankompaniets chefer, Herrar Sven Salén och Carl Matthiesen. – Han bor som gast hos Banankompaniets disponent, Knut Båge, Karlavägen 93, Stockholm.

One may conjecture that the Swedish firms listed above had been the chosen vehicle for de Wahl’s investments.

The thread joining Salén, Henrik de Wahl, Lauer and Wallenberg – a thread which bears the name “Banankompaniet” – is worth pondering.
In considering the background to Raoul’s mission to Budapest, it can naturally be asked why the Swedish Foreign Office decided to support the American initiative. One answer is that it wished to support actively such a humanitarian action for its own sake. But saintly attitudes never take us very far in understanding why Foreign Offices make the decisions they do. Equally important was the general perception that the USA was going to dominate the postwar Western World and that it was important to get on the right side of the Americans. Just as the Swedes (as opposed to the Swiss) took a much more compliant attitude to working with the Americans on the Safehaven programme, so the Swedes were prepared to work with the Americans on the Hungarian project. They were steps in the right direction, with an eye to the future.

Needless to say Foreign Offices are not the only entities to pursue policies favourable to their own future interests. So do companies and individuals. Now a man like Sven Salén who was keenly interested in expanding his transoceanic lines after the war, had every reason also to cultivate the Americans. His decision to allow one of the directors of Mellaneuropeiska to go on an American inspired mission to Budapest was not merely *en god gärning*: it was also a very large and splendid feather in his cap when dealing with the American authorities.

In a recent book Jonathan Brent, an American publisher and academic, devotes a chapter to his attempt to locate a KGB file in Moscow dealing with

Michael Kutuzov-Tolstoy

In the completion of this entry, I have received invaluable help (including copies of certain documents) from Prof Dr. Michael Hagemeister who was himself a pupil at Kutuzov-Tolstoy’s school in Ireland and knew the man personally.

In a recent book Jonathan Brent, *Inside the Stalin Archives: discovering the new Russia*, 2009
Michael Kutuzov-Tolstoy, a White Russian of aristocratic lineage, who served in a peripheral capacity initially with Valdemar Langlet's Swedish Red Cross organisation and subsequently with the Swedish Legation in Budapest in 1944. Like many similar attempts, Brent’s search ended in failure. The existence and location of the file remains a mystery. General interest in it derives not simply from its potential value as a source on the activities of the Swedes, and Wallenberg in particular, in the Hungarian capital, compiled by a contemporary witness, but from the suspicion that the testimony of Kutuzov-Tolstoy may have seriously damaged Wallenberg in the eyes of the Russians. This suspicion received considerable nourishment from the publication of the memoirs of Pavel Sudoplatov, a former high-ranking member of the wartime NKVD. According to Sudoplatov, Kutuzov-Tolstoy had been recruited by the Organs in the 1920s and later in Budapest had supplied reports in which “Wallenberg's work in Hungary was given a dubious cast.” More specifically, according to Kutuzov-Tolstoy, Wallenberg was doubling up as a German agent. Sudoplatov's account has been echoed by Lev Bezymenskii.

Despite the fact that we lack Kutuzov-Tolstoy's file, there are several other sources which allow us to document his activities in Budapest. According to Kutuzov-Tolstoy's own account, his working association with the Swedes in Budapest began in March 1944 with the visit of Langlet and his wife to the cottage in the village of Vágsellye, near the Slovakian border where the Kutuzov-Tolstoys were then living. Langlet invited Kutuzov-Tolstoy to assist in the work of the Swedish Red Cross. This was a paid position carrying a small

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72 Sudoplatov, op.cit., p. 268

73 Lev Bezymenskii, *Budapeshtskii Messiya* (Moskva :Sovershenno Sektretno, 2001). Professor Hagemeister has told me that before the publication of his book, Bezymenskii, who had apparently seen Kutuzov-Tolstoy's file in some archive, told him that it was Kutuzov-Tolstoy who had shopped Raoul Wallenberg to the Russians. Bezymenskii’s exakt words: "er hat ihn verpiffen"
salary and the possibility of accommodation in Budapest. It deserves to be noted, however, that this was not the first occasion on which he had been involved with Red Cross activities. There is a letter dated 19 April 1943 from G.Kapolnas on the Hungarian Red Cross thanking Kutuzov-Tolstoy for his offer to assist with correspondence in French which was said to be voluminous on account of the Belgian prisoners. In other words, long before his connection with the Swedes, Kutuzov-Tolstoy had made contact with the Hungarian Red Cross.

The work performed by Kutuzov-Tolstoy for the Swedes is summed up in a report which Langlet wrote for the Board of the Swedish Red Cross. According to this report, the Legation had freely made available an office consisting of three large rooms and a secretarial staff of carefully chosen volunteers, employed in receiving, sorting, answering and carding the vast number of enquiries streaming into the office.

Byrån som står under ledning av synnerligen lämpliga och skickliga personer, nämligen begiska undersåten greve Michael Tolstoy och engelsmannen mr. Dickinson med resp.

74 Michael Kutuzov-Tolstoy, The Story of My Life, Blue Horns Publishing-House, Bernd E. Scholz, Marburg/Lahn, 1986. See p. 108. It is somewhat remarkable that this book is seldom mentioned by authors on Wallenberg who otherwise eagerly draw attention to K-T. The book by K-T’s wife Miriam is also worth consulting.

75 According to Kutuzov-Tolstoy’s own account, Langlet had been made aware of the Russian by one of his associates, Countess Berta Berg-Nakó, who was apparently on friendly terms with the Kutuzov-Tolstoys.

76 It is noteworthy that Kutuzov-Tolstoy specifically emphasizes that the position carried no salary. However, Nina Langlet is quite definite about this matter and I see no reason for her to have got this wrong. Kutuzov-Tolstoy, on the other hand, had a motive to blur the truth on this point, perhaps to obscure his probably disastrous financial situation at the time which was painful to recollect or perhaps to give his work for the Red Cross a more idealistic and disinterested character.

77 See the entry for John Casson Dickinson.
As Langlet himself admitted the results of these Red Cross enquiries was extremely uncertain and he was inclined to see the whole exercise of having a psychological function in giving the Jews making these enquiries the feeling that they were at least doing something for their nearest kin. Both Kutuzov-Tolstoy and Dickinson appear to have become dissatisfied with what they were doing and sought alternative work, Kutuzov-Tolstoy with the running of a hospital and Dickinson in assisting RW.

Long before the publication of Sudoplatov's book, suspicions about Kutuzov-Tolstoy's role had been ventilated in the Swiss judicial postwar cross-examination of staff who had served at the Swiss Legation in Budapest. The chief interest of these Swiss statements, is that they present us with a plausible and concrete motivation for Kutuzov-Tolstoy's negative attitude to the neutral legations. With regard to the Swiss legation, there were two issues which appear to have caused resentment on the part of Kutuzov-Tolstoy. The first was the question of accommodation. Kutuzov-Tolstoy believed that he and his wife Myriam should have been allowed to reside at the Belgian Legation by


virtue of the fact that they had been good friends of the former Belgian Minister, Count de la Laigne. However, this appeal was rejected by the Swiss Minister, Werner Jaeger, on the grounds that de la Laigne, in leaving Hungary, had expressed the wish that the Belgian diplomatic residence should be occupied by representatives of the Protective Power acting on behalf of Belgium. This practice had been followed and the residence had been occupied first by the Americans and subsequently by the Swiss.

The second cause of resentment was that Kutuzov-Tolstoy had applied for a Swiss visa and had been refused.\(^1\) It was explained to him that it was useless to apply for a Swiss visa, since as an enemy alien (from the Hungarian viewpoint) he would neither be granted an exit visa from Hungary nor a transit visa by Germany. Kutuzov-Tolstoy, however, had not let the matter rest but had gone to the Swiss Minister, Jaeger. The latter simply restated the position.

Kutuzov-Tolstoy's resentment in regard to the Swedes is brought out partly in the Swiss material already cited and in the accounts published by Kutuzov-Tolstoy and his wife after the war.\(^2\)

One principal bone of contention was Kutuzov-Tolstoy's conviction that the Swedes, although formally acting as Protective Power for Russia in Hungary, had failed to do enough for Russian POWs in the country. Associated with this claim were (a) Kutuzov-Tolstoy's probable desire to inflate his own status in the eyes of the Soviet authorities by claiming that he - and not minister Danielsson - had taken the initiative in doing something for these POWs by visiting the camp at Veszkény and more generally in opening a hospital to look after POWs of several nations and wounded civilians (b) the general judgement of Kutuzov-Tolstoy that the imminent arrival of the Soviet army fundamentally altered

\(^1\) Cross examination of Charles Lutz, dated 30 May 1945, Kehrli investigation. See p. 11.

humanitarian priorities. In his autobiography, Kutuzov-Tolstoy writes as follows:

Mr. Danielsson was I believe, satisfied with our first bid. I suggested to him to facilitate a repeat of our visit [to Vaszkény], and as by mid-October, the siege of Budapest had become a tragic but inevitable reality, I put it to him that only a Swedish Red Cross Hospital, open to all belligerents, would be a solution to the problems which surrounded him. And I offered him to take on the management of this hospital, if he would sponsor me, and support me. He finally did.

There was a lot of friction on the subject within the Swedish Red Cross. The original one we had been invited to join in spring 1944 was to be a “crusade for the persecuted Jews”. The S.R.C. had done all it could for many months, and with some success, but I felt that major events were now superseding it, and that they should be tackled first of all. Sections of the Swedish Red Cross disagreed with this view, and certainly delayed the Minister's decision.  

A later source of Kutuzov-Tolstoy's resentment with regard to the Swedes was the discovery that despite having been asked by Danielson to take over the running of a hospital for POWs, he did not figure in a list of personnel attached to the Swedish legation which had been sent to Moscow. According to his wife's account, this omission led to suspicion of and hostility towards Kutuzov-Tolstoy in his cross-examination by the Soviet authorities in Budapest. There is no doubt, however, that Danielsson conferred on him – after all a non-Swedish subject – exceptional powers in representing the

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83 Michael Kutuzov-Tolstoy, op.cit., p. 116

84 Miriam Kutuzov-Tolstoy, op.cit., See p. 266. "Why not confess that my mandate was a fake? I said it was not a fake I pointed to Karlsson's [=Danielsson's] signature and the Legation stamp. Then I should be on the official list, he replied, sent by the Swedish Legation to Moscow, giving the names of all the members of the legation and of those entrusted with Swedish interests. I maintained that of course I was on the list. That was a lie, he said and pulled some papers from his desk. He showed me the list and I read it through. Everybody was there except myself”. If the statement of Grosheim-Krisko is correct, this cannot be wholly true since according to the latter his name had also been omitted.
Swedish legation in the initial meeting with the Russians entering Budapest as the following document makes clear:

[Omitted an image of K-T’s “fullmakt” dated 4/11/44 and signed by Danielsson, giving K-T full authority (i) to deal with the Russians regarding all issues arising with respect to Russian POWs who were under the care of Sweden as Protecting Power (ii) to make and maintain contact with the Russian military authorities so long as the the Legation in Buda was unable to do so] 85

In the material I have consulted, it should be noted that I have found no explicit judgement of Kutuzov-Tolstoy relating specifically and explicitly to RW. It is the Swiss and Swedish Ministers in Budapest, Jaeger and Danielsson, who figure most prominently. In Myriam Kutuzov-Tolstoy's roman à clefs, however, we find the following passage:

The delegate who had arrived from Sweden a few months before to organize the Protective Passport Offices, was now getting into difficulties. His agents seemed to have lost all sense of right or wrong. His offices were a centre for speculation of all kinds and graft on an imposing scale. 87

The intended target (Wallenberg) of this sketch seems clear enough. Although there is nothing to connect Wallenberg with any irregularities occurring in his office, there is no doubt that such irregularities did take place. 88

85 This authorisation of course also exists in Russian. I am grateful to Michael Hagemeister for a copy of this document.

86 Perhaps chronicle with pseudonyms substituted for real names would be a more exact description.

87 Miriam Kutuzov-Tolstoy, op. cit. p. 78.
The impression gained from the foregoing assorted remarks is less that of a significant spy and more that of a gossip and office intriguer whose pride has been hurt and whose words might easily be used in the appropriate circumstances for the purposes of denunciation. This impression is further borne out by two incidents noted in the Swiss documentation. On one occasion in 1945, Kutuzov-Tolstoy-now working for the Soviet military authorities in Budapest - had informed Swiss representatives that according to an instruction from Moscow the Swiss were no longer to be received as talking partners in Budapest. Later when the Swiss actually had talks with the Soviet Liaison officer, Colonel Susmanovich the latter denied all knowledge of such an instruction and happily received the Swiss delegates. On another occasion, Kutuzov-Tolstoy had informed the Englishman Tier that he would make it his business to ensure that the Swiss legation had to leave Hungary.

Despite the above, it should be noted that Swiss opinion was not unanimous about Kutuzov-Tolstoy. Consul Lutz was convinced of his dubious role. But Meier who was held for a time by the Russians before the Swiss authorities secured his release, has this to say:

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88 The occurrence of improprieties is confirmed elsewhere, notably by Langlet and his wife. See Nina Langlet, Kaos i Budapest, p 34.


90 According to Tschuy, Geoffrey Tier was an elderly teacher of English who had stayed on in Budapest with the intention of supplying the British Secret Service with information about German security activities. Apparently he had given up this idea. He and his wife moved in with Lutz at the Swiss legation.

It may be that Meier's view is naive in one regard. We know that the Soviet organs were adept in recruiting members of the White Russian community so that Kutuzov-Tolstoy's status as a White Russian says very little in itself. Indeed Sudoplatov speaks of Kutuzov-Tolstoy's recruitment in the 1920s thus conjuring up an image of a long-term agent reporting on White Russian circles in western Europe. Yet at the same time, Sudoplatov is silent not only about Kutuzov-Tolstoy's earlier activities during the 1920s and 1930s but also about the form which Kutuzov-Tolstoy's later charges against Wallenberg took. How far were the main charges against the Swede obtained under the Count's cross-examination in Budapest by Soviet counterintelligence following the end of hostilities when it can be assumed that he was under considerable pressure to deliver the information his questioners demanded? How far was it based on reports supplied clandestinely to the Soviet authorities somewhat earlier in the second half of 1944?

There is also another question which should be asked. Given that the Soviet Secret Services undoubtedly had other agents reporting from Budapest in 1944-1945, can we be entirely sure that Sudoplatov may not have exaggerated Kutuzov-Tolstoy's role as an informant as a way of protecting other more important sources or for some other more mundane reason?\footnote{Protokoll über die Abhörung von Herrn Kanzleiskretär M.Meier vom 15. und 17. April 1946 in E 2001(D) 1000/1537:/17, AFS, Berne.}

\footnote{Even section heads of intelligence services see only part of the picture.}
Count Michael Kutuzov-Tolstoy and his wife Myriam stayed on in Budapest initially working as language teachers for Russian military personnel based in Hungary. Later he became manager of the Russian Section of the Hungarian Credit Bank, a position he held until March 1950. Finally he acted as an interpreter with the Hungarian Central Agency until 1950 when he was told that his services were no longer required. He then contacted the Belgian Legation and with their help, the couple were able to return to Belgium where Myriam had considerable property. During a visit to England in February 1951, Kutuzov learned that an old Russian friend and school-fellow, Captain N.J. Couriss lived there. Couriss ran a language school at Collon, County Louth. Kutuzov-Tolstoy and his wife now decided to move to Ireland and acquired the language school in Collon. According to Kutuzov-Tolstoy's own statement in his autobiography, his residence in Ireland was initially opposed by the Irish Department of Justice, with the Americans exerting pressure in the background. His successful application to be allowed to stay, he attributes to the intervention of Belgian diplomat friends and a change in the Irish government. During his earlier years in Ireland, there is clear indication that he was the object of surveillance by the Irish police and the British Security Service, MI5.

In 1955, Danielsson in tranquil retirement in Bordighera, was undoubtedly surprised when a letter dated 22 January from Kutuzov-Tolstoy now installed

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93 Kutuzov-Tolstoy had been best man at Couriss’ wedding in Germany in 1923.

94 When Couriss found out that his former friend intended settling in Ireland, he contacted Irish Military Intelligence, explaining that while he could speak warmly of their earlier days of friendship, he could not vouch for the years K-T had spent in Hungary.

95 See the personal file “Count Tolstoy”, P395, in the archive of the Irish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Irish National Archive, Dublin. The MIS’s interest in Kutuzov-Tolstoy was occasioned by a report from Ireland that the Count intended to visit England. This report was generously drawn to my attention by Professor Eunan O’Halpin, Trinity College, Dublin.
on “the Green Isle” dropped through his letter box. This was to lead to a further exchange of letters between the two men. It is hard to escape the impression that the main purpose of re-awakening this contact with Danielsson was to allow Kutuzov-Tolstoy to disseminate his theory of what had happened to Wallenberg, namely that the Swede had been killed en route to the Russian lines. Not surprisingly this patently false theory did nothing for Kutuzoz-Tolstoy’s standing in the eyes of UD. Arne Lundberg’s commentary sums up the official Swedish position:

Det är osannolikt, att en man som Tolstoj, som I grund känner ryssarnas metoder och med största sannolikhet fortfarande är rysk agent, skulle ha skrivit brevet till Danielsson utan ryskt uppdrag. Det får följaktligen anses övervägande sannolikt, att Tolstojs brev hade två syften: att söka övertyga oss om att W. omkommit i Budapest och att undersöka, om vårt bevismaterial är så dåligt, att Tolstojs historia skulle intressera oss. Är detta riktigt, måste enda förklaringen vara, att ryssarna är väl medvetna om att W. funnits i rysk fångenskap. Man kan t.o.m. fråga sig, om inte förutsättningen för att man skall företaga en sådan aktion rent av är, att W. alltjämt lever.96


**Edvard Otto Max:son Engeström**

While a great deal of attention has been paid to Kutuzov-Tolstoy’s role as a possible Judas in betraying RW to the Russians, very little has been said about Engeström and his name finds scarcely a mention either in books on RW or in more sober government reports.97 This is surprising because in a real sense, Engeström is the one man who, as we shall presently see, had a quite concrete

motive for hoping that Raoul Wallenberg would not return to Stockholm. The story, as recorded in Engeström’s security police file, is as follows.

Via one of Raoul Wallenberg’s nearest associates, Guy von Dardel learned that there was person X (later identified as Stephan Wirak or Virag) who had approached another of Wallenberg’s colleagues, Dr. Pal Hegedűs, and confessed to Hegedűs that he had been asked to spy upon the Swedish Legation. Apparently, however, X did not wish to do this since the girl to whom he was engaged, was Jewish. The latter had been helped by Raoul Wallenberg and now X wished to repay Wallenberg’s kindness. X was nonetheless offered money by Wallenberg to carry out certain services on behalf of the legation. X refused to accept the money and said that he simply wished to assist the Swedes. The upshot was that X was then given prepared reports about the work of the legation to lay before the Arrow Cross counterespionage organisation. After a time, X was told by his control that the reports he supplied were not consistent with other reports which the counterespionage service was receiving. X was now curious about this other source of reports and eventually found out that it was the Swede Engeström. He informed Wallenberg of this. Wallenberg now attempted to acquire proof of Engeström’s guilt but according to von Dardel, it was unclear if he succeeded. However, RW had certainly discussed the matter with Anger.

After the war, von Dardel was put in touch via Hegedűs with X who had offered to get proof of Engeström’s role as a spy. The proof would consist of a statement from Engeström’s counterespionage control of the amounts of money Engeström had received together with a report submitted by Engeström to his control and actually bearing his signature. [At the time of this later offer

97 An exception among books is Rudolph Philipp’s old work Raoul Wallenberg (Stockholm: Fredborgs förlag, 1946). Although the book is not error-free (and what book is!) and although Philipps may have become a “Wallenberg obsessive” and victim of paranoia (see his Säpo file P2210, Arninge), his little book on Wallenberg, is a mine of information. Whether all this information should have been released in 1946 when RW’s fate still hung in the balance, is another matter.

98 Engeström, G-akt 230:121/P107, Säpo arkiv, Arninge. See the PM of L.Medin of 29/10/46.
of his services, X was said to be linked the Hungarian government’s counterespionage service].

As a result, Rudolph Philipp who was acting on behalf of Guy von Dardel, asked Otto Danielsson of the Swedish Security Service (and later to become that organisation’s principle expert on Wallenberg) to travel to Prague to interview X. However, this was disallowed by Danielsson’s superiors on the grounds that any such enquiry would be interpreted by the Czechs as ‘intelligence gathering’ and thus could lead to diplomatic embarrassment, not to mention placing Danielsson in personal danger.

Instead, what happened was that Engeström who found himself temporarily on Swedish soil, was hauled in for questioning.

To his interviewer, Engeström must have appeared a somewhat exotic and therefore suspicious bird. Born in Malmö on August 13, 1899, he had taken his Student Exam in Växjö. That was reassuring enough. But then he had gone off to Paris in 1919 where he had attended some institution which prepared people for the diplomatic service. In 1921, he married a lady of White Russian descent who owned an estate at Mozsgo in Hungary. After some further desultory studies, he threw himself into a variety of commercial ventures. Gradually, however, the main focus of his interests settled on the Balkans. He spoke fluent Hungarian and Hungary remained his base. However, he was heavily involved in business in Romania, which in turn involved, in some unspecified way, contacts with Swiss firms.

At the end of the war, Engeström had been arrested by the Russians at his apartment in Budapest in February 1945 and questioned about his contacts with White Russians. Initially they had not asked about Wallenberg except to

99 He spoke of studying International Law “as a hobby”. Later in Switzerland, he styled himself “Dr.Juris” but whether this was more cosmetic and promotional than genuine, remains unclear. Given all his various business schemes and estate management, he may have found it hard to find the time for much serious study.
try to find about “that fund”\textsuperscript{100} of his. Later there were questions about the number of protective documents issued by Wallenberg.

Engeström was grilled at Horthy’s villa in Hungary that served as a NKVD HQ, taken to Pressburg (Bratislava) in Slovakia for further interrogation and then brought back to Hungary again for further questions. On September 11, 1945, in circumstances far from clear\textsuperscript{101}, Engeström managed to escape and leave the Balkans altogether. He claimed to have left 5 million crowns behind him in Hungary.

It was certainly a tangled tail and it is hard to see that it shed much light on what Engeström got up to in the Balkans. The questioning seemed to lack focus and no attempt was made to dig deeper. The problem was perhaps that on the domestic front in Sweden, Engeström had an unblemished record. If he had done something wrong, it had taken place outside the country. After this interview, very few concrete steps seem to have been taken by the Swedish authorities to investigate Engeström further, apart from a routine enquiry concerning a legal case involving Engeström in Switzerland. Nevertheless Engeström remained on file with the Swedish security police and his file somewhat later in the early 1950s would be expanded by a report which perhaps reveals a bit more about the man.

Now the fact that Engeström had been involved in certain legal proceedings in Switzerland, prompted me quite routinely to investigate if the Federal Archives in Berne held any documents dealing with the Swede and the answer turned out to be ‘yes’.\textsuperscript{102}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{100} Presumably the rumour about Wallenberg’s connection to the American Joint Distribution Fund had been transformed into dreams of some great pile of money that Wallenberg had stashed away somewhere.

\textsuperscript{101} This, of course, is a critical point: how could he get away?

\textsuperscript{102} Engeström files in E2001(D) 1000/1553: vol 263, dossier B.41.13.S (1945); E 4320 (B) 1990/266: vol 203, dossier C.16.2498 (1941-1946); and E 7391, 1978/79: vol 55, page 138, all in AFS, Berne. I owe a great debt to Christine Lauener at AFS for her considerable efforts in helping me in my detective work.\end{flushright}
Engeström had made several trips to Switzerland during the war and had been the object of discrete surveillance by the Swiss.

The account of Engeström which appears in the Swiss documents is somewhat more forthcoming and more interesting than that to be found in the Swedish archives.

On Thursday, 17 April, Engeström had arrived in Zurich from Lausanne and booked himself in at that superb watering hole of the rich, Hotel Baur au Lac. No sooner in the door than he was in touch with the firm Metropol about ordering the services of a secretary. The next day was taken up with a number of visits, first to Bank Winterstein & Co, next Schweizerische Bankgesellschaft (SBG) on Banhofstrasse, and finally before lunch a brief visit to the German Consulate. After lunching at the Station buffet, the afternoon began with a new visit to SBG which lasted an hour and a half. Afterwards Engeström returned to Baur au Lac where he worked with his secretary until 8.30 in the evening.

Meanwhile the Swiss Police intelligence service which had been keeping a close eye on Engeström’s movements, had by this time received a confidential briefing from SBG about what had transpired at their meeting with Engeström. It turned out that Engeström was involved in currency transactions of some magnitude in which the Swiss banks themselves had an interest. SBG was not involved in the actual mechanics of this which was usually carried out by other banks such as the Bär, Vogel and Winterstein banks. Engeström evidently was buying large amounts of pounds, dollars and gold bars. The trade in gold bars was particularly interesting since only four weeks before, gold had been brought in from the Balkans and now was returning there.

After keeping discreetly in the background, the Swiss police decided it was time to question Engeström personally under the pretext that it was necessary to have this information in connection with his future journeys to Switzerland on business.

The account which Engeström now gave the Swiss police differed markedly from that he would later supply to their Swedish counterparts. According to Engeström who did not fail to mention his estate near the Hungarian-Yugoslav border, he was the representative of the Bofors company and had a flat in Bucharest. He claimed that before the war, he had occasionally acted as a
courier for the Swedish Legation in Bucharest and had often also carried Swiss diplomatic post, in particular to Copenhagen. There now occurred a slightly bizarre scene (it would not be the last involving him) with Engeström grabbing a case and showing his interviewer a collection of pounds, dollars and gold bars to the tune of 300 000 Swiss Francs, which he claimed was bribe money that he needed in the arms trade. Without such schmiergeld, it was impossible to do business in Romania\(^\text{103}\). Engeström, himself, was engaged in “triangular trade” \([\text{Dreieckgeschäfte}]\) in the sense that he sold Swiss-owned textile factories in Hungary to Hungarians, thus releasing Swiss capital which was otherwise locked in Hungary. All this involved complex currency transactions.

Engeström’s account of the Dreieckgeschäfte was confirmed in a Swiss Police Intelligence report of July 2, 1941 which simultaneously endorsed the value of Engeström’s manipulations for Switzerland:


\hspace{1cm}\textit{Jede Unterstützung geboten werden sollte!} : clearly Engeström had friends in high places. However, in the event, it did not spare him later substantial fines and costs after the war for a breach of wartime Swiss trade regulations pertaining to the sale of gold\(^\text{104}\).

\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{103} "Die Korruption in Rumänien sei für unsere Begriffe unfassbar gross und sei ganz ausgeschlossen, mit Regierungsstellen ein Geschäft zu machen, ohne das meistens ein Prozentsatz von 10-15\% des Verkaufsbetrages als Schmiergeld bezahlt werde”.

\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{104} This was the business that the Swedish authorities made a routine enquiry about.
So ends the story of Edvard Otto Max:son Engeström. Well not quite. His Säpo file at Riksarkivet, Arninge closes with a report\textsuperscript{105} about a curious incident which took place in Paris in the Spring of 1950. A Finnish lady ML living in the French capital had applied for a job which she had seen advertised in the newspaper. The prospective employer turned out to be a certain Herr Engeström, apparently now local director of a well known Swedish travel agency. When ML turned up for interview, she was received by another woman. When she asked the latter what the job consisted of, the woman replied that she was forbidden to speak about it otherwise he (Engeström) would hit her!

At this stage, with the woman showing her bruises, it is to be wondered that ML did not flee the place directly. However, she pursued the matter further and met Engeström himself, who explained that the job consisted of “intelligence work”: she was to keep under surveillance a certain American (a politician or similar) and she was to be sent to Madrid where Engeström was planning to open a new office.

As the old adage puts it: \textit{it is much easier to join the intelligence game than to leave it}.\textsuperscript{106}

\textbf{Anatoli Granovsky}

In discussing the Swedish options for indulging in a spot of horse-trading with the Soviet side in an effort to repatriate RW, mention is often made of the case of Anatoli Granovsky who jumped ship (the \textit{Petrodvorets}) while it was temporarily berthed in Stockholm’s harbour. Granovsky was no ordinary

\textsuperscript{105} PM dated 26/2/52.

\textsuperscript{106} It is possible that new documents containing further information about Engeström and his wartime activities may eventually emerge. The present author has seen one list of German agents in the Balkans where Engeström was listed as a specialist in currency transactions on behalf of the Abwehr.
seaman but a member of a branch of the Soviet Security organs who wished to defect. Needless to say, his former employers were keen to have him back and a tug of war ensued over his body. The Swedish Government eventually ruled that Granovsky should not be handed back to Russia. Instead he was allowed to slip out of the country.

One aspect of the Granovsky case is often missed. The fact is that initially Granovksy sought asylum at the US Legation in Stockholm: he did not defect to the Swedes. Between the date of his leaving the ship, 21 September 1946 and being held by the Swedish police at the crossroads of Storgatan and Torstenssøns gatan, six days passed. What happened in this key interval was the following. When he first jumped ship, he went to see Captain Robb, the US military attaché’s assistant who passed him along the chain in a series of interviews. According to Granovsky’s own account, one of the interview sessions went badly with the American interrogator demanding a list of the names of Soviet spies which he could not provide. The Americans were at this stage still wary: the whole thing might be a provocation. Reading between the lines, it was therefore decided that the best policy would be to let the Swedish counterespionage people have a go at him and see what they made of him. If he turned out to be genuine then the Americans could always take him back again.

107 Originally, I had assigned Granovsky to the NKVD, mainly on the strength of the title of his own book “I was an NKVD agent”. However Vadim Birstein, whose knowledge of these matters is much superior to my own, maintains that he was an officer, not of the NKVD, but of the NKGB.

108 Most of the relevant facts will be found in Granovsky’s own book I was an NKVD agent (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1962). Despite its rather lurid title, it is quite a revealing account of Stalin’s Russia in the 20s and 30s. Granovsky’s father was a chemical engineer who became part of the nomenklatura, before falling into disfavour.

109 Granovsky’s Säpo file PS928, Arninge.
As it turned out, Granovsky passed the test, having delivered quite a lot of information to the Swedes. On November 8, 1946, the Minister of Justice, Herman Zetterberg announced the government’s decision:

The King decrees that Granovsky shall be dispatched from the country and that his return shall be prohibited unless, in the event of a visa not being required, he has obtained a permit of residence before his arrival.

Regarding the execution of the Order of dispatch the King ordains that Granovsky shall, not against his will, be sent back to his national country, nor to any country where, presumably, he does not enjoy safety against being returned to his national country.110

What happened next is of relevance. The Swedes waved him off on his way to Denmark111, but in Denmark he kept going until he arrived in Berlin. In the bombed out German capital, the Americans had set up their Berlin Operations Base (BOB) and Granovsky now became BOB’s star asset, providing the Station, according to one who knew its history well, with its first solid information on the organization, personnel and methodology of the Soviet organs112. His information about Soviet operations in the Ukraine and Ruthenia were of special value.

It is entirely possible, in my view indeed probable, that the Soviet Security Service knew of Granovsky’s debriefing at BOB although perhaps not in full detail what he revealed. But the mere fact that Granovsky had been enabled to


111 He travelled to Hälsinborg on 15 November 1946, accompanied by Lars Lindroth from Säpo.

112 The informed judgement came from David Murphy. See David Murphy, Segei A. Kondrashev and George Baiky, Battleground Berlin CIA vs KGN in the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997)
slip out of Sweden to end up a guest of the new US intelligence HQ in Berlin meant that Sweden *de facto* had favoured the Americans in the dispute over Granovsky. This realisation can only have stiffened Soviet resolve to stonewall over Swedish questions about the missing diplomat Wallenberg and to remain unco-operative.

**Open Questions**

In the course of my research on Raoul Wallenberg and his mission and in the foregoing pages, I have encountered various questions to which I personally have no answer. So I shall end by summarizing them, in the hope that someone somewhere will be able to bring clarification in the future.

1. What happened to the commercial archive of Mellaneuropeiska?

2. In his book on Schellenberg and the Swiss Intelligence Service, *Geheimer Draht nach Berlin*, Pierre-Th. Braunschweig notes that he came across a document in the German Bundesarchiv,Koblenz, indicating that Raoul Wallenberg had acted as Schellenberg’s contact man in a German overture to the Russians in Stockholm in 1943. Unfortunately he made no note of the document although he remains convinced that the person named as contact was RAOUl Wallenberg and not some other Wallenberg. If this turned out to be true, then of course our way at looking at Raoul Wallenberg would also radically change. Incidentally the German overture may not have been what it looked: an offer of separate peace with the Russians. Instead, it may have been simply designed to put pressure on the Western side to have talks with Schellenberg. In connection with this, it may be remembered that Lauer in one document describes Raoul Wallenberg as Jacob Wallenberg’s secretary. This assertion is not confirmed elsewhere by anyone else. But if we entertain the notion that any peace feeler to the Russians might have gone through Jacob Wallenberg, the notion of Raoul as a contact man would not then be absurd. These speculations raise the fundamental problem of whether there are episodes in Marcus and Jacob’s wartime activities which
are still not known. (Probable answer: assuredly yes!) In Sergo Beria’s, book on his father\(^\text{113}\), there occurs the following startling claim. Writing of the first months following Barbarossa, he writes as follows: “For his [Stalin’s] part, he made several attempts to negotiate with the Germans, so as to confuse them. The Wallenbergs, Swedish industrialists, acted as go-betweens in one [my italics] of these initiatives”. Now one knows from Krushchev’s secret speech about the peace feeler that went through the Bulgarian, Stamenov. But no one, repeat no one except Sergio Beria, has mentioned the Wallenbergs as go-betweens at this early period. Has he got it all wrong?\(^\text{114}\) Whatever the answer, the first concrete step is to see if one find the German document spotted by Braunschweig in Bundesarchiv and take it from there.

3. Can more be discovered about the last minute deal hatched by Wallenberg and Becher about a train to take Jews to Sweden and can it be determined if the Russians knew about it?

4. Can more be found out about Henrik de Wahl and his business interests in Hungary and Sweden during and directly after the war?


\(^\text{114}\) Many people would raise objections about the reliability of Sergo Beria and Sudoplatov as historical witnesses. A profoundly sceptical view of the worth of their testimony is held, for example, by Vadim Birstein. Susanne Berger has pointed out for me, on the other hand, that in an interview with Lev Bezymenskii on October 23, 2000 in *Novoje Vremya*, Bezymenskii drew attention to KGB General Radomir Bogdanov’s contention that there had been a channel between Beria and Himmler via the Wallenbergs in 1941. Furthermore, Bogdanov apparently believed that Raoul Wallenberg had somehow been personally involved in this channel. For Birstein, such an argument would presumably carry little weight since his scepticism extends also to several of Bezymenskii’s assertions about the case of Raoul Wallenberg.
5. Should a formal request be made to the appropriate Russian authorities to check the file of Spitchkin to see if it contains anything of relevance to the case of Raoul Wallenberg?

6. Are there still things to discover about the relationship between Raoul Wallenberg and Lolle Smit?

C.G. McKay, Submitted to UD, January 2011.